From Challenge
# 70 November-December 2001
Afghan Boomerang
America's nurture of militant Islam and the miscalculations
of Osama Bin Laden
Yacov Ben Efrat
Introduction: Made by the USA
UNTIL RECENTLY, the name "Afghanistan" had an exotic ring to many,
but not to US policy-makers. For a decade (1979-1989) they backed the Afghan
war against the Soviet Union, contributing to the latter's collapse. The
new world order had its start, one might say, in this desolate country,
although it reached its heyday a short time later in the Gulf War.
Among the "Mujahidin" who fought the Soviet Union were some who refused
to accept the new world order. They saw the Afghan victory as a sign of
Islamic superiority. The anti-Soviet war was a struggle against an Infidel
Empire. The support they had received from America seemed to them merely
a temporary conjunction of interests.
The existence of these maverick groups, with their offbeat interpretation,
aroused no misgivings in Washington. There were two reasons for complacency.
One was the lopsided balance of forces: a great world power could hardly
feel threatened by scattered bands of lightly armed fighters. Secondly,
these former allies continued to collaborate in the US campaign to smash
the Yugoslav federation, first in Bosnia, later in Kosovo. They also inflamed
the war against Russia in Chechnya; here they cooperated with American
oil companies, which sought to secure the energy resources of the Caspian
Sea.
In Afghanistan, one of these groups, the Taliban, took power by force
in 1996. It sheltered and sustained Osama Bin Laden, who issued a religious
decree in 1998 calling for jihad, holy war, against the US. Yet here an
additional factor blinded Washington: its regional allies, Saudi Arabia,
Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates, all supported the Taliban with arms
and money. Indeed, the sole recognition of the Taliban government came
from these three.
How could America's main Muslim allies support the Taliban, who backed
Osama Bin Laden's decree of jihad? And why did America fail to take the
threat seriously?
In order to answer these questions, we need to examine the roots of
the current war. Whatever may have been Osama Bin Laden's role in igniting
the conflict, it is a mistake to attribute the unprecedented attacks of
September 11 to his extremist views alone. Extremism thrives in a specific
political, social and economic reality, which is that of most peoples today.
It is by no means typical to Islam. We find it among those former Yugoslavs
who have since become ultra-nationalistic, or in Italy and Austria, where
Fascists are again in government, or among the perpetrators of massacre
in Africa, and even in the US itself, among Christian fundamentalists eagerly
awaiting Armageddon. Extremism is an epidemic of global proportions.
America backed the Afghan war against the Soviet Union, contributing
to the latter's collapse. The name "Afghanistan", then, is directly connected
to America's global hegemony. The new world order had its start in this
desolate country.
I. Afghanistan:forsaken land
From 1979 until 1989, the US was extremely busy in Afghanistan, then ruled
by forces of the Soviet Union. America saw the Soviet presence as a threat
to its influence in central Asia, and especially as a threat to its allies,
Pakistan and Turkey. The Iranian revolution had recently toppled the Shah.
This trauma heightened America's anxiety about Afghanistan's fall to the
Soviets. As a counterweight, Anwar Sadat signed the Camp David Accords,
crossing to the Western bloc. Yet because of his subsequent isolation in
the Arab world, his about-face did not reassure America concerning the
area's future.
In order to realize its ambition of shaping events in Afghanistan, the
US needed a more aggressive foreign policy. That required an internal transformation.
It happened at the end of 1980, when conservative Republican Ronald Reagan
defeated Democrat Jimmy Carter. Reagan entered the White House armed with
an extreme anti-Soviet political program. Almost immediately he found a
close ally in Pakistan's leader, General Zia al-Haq, who had overthrown
the legal government of Ali Bhutto three years earlier.
The Carter Administration had imposed sanctions on Pakistan because
of its nuclear-weapons program and abuses of human rights; Reagan promptly
canceled them. He provided generous military assistance. Pakistan became
third among the nations receiving US foreign aid. (Digital
National Security Archive.) In return, it supported US policy.
In order to win domestic legitimacy for his dictatorial regime, General
Zia began to depend on Islamist tendencies. While suppressing political
parties and canceling freedoms, he tried to give the regime a new identity.
Among the religious movements he relied on was Jama'at al-Islam, a right-wing
fundamentalist party founded in 1941. Zia gave it broad powers to administer
the educational system, including the universities. He also helped it gain
influence over the media. (Alavi.)
The power of this party extended to all aspects of life, including the
military, arousing concern within the Pakistani opposition. The idyll between
Zia and the Islamists reached its height in 1980, when Islamic law (Shariah)
became the law of the land.
The fundamentalist character of Pakistan's regime did not bother Washington.
On the contrary, the CIA adopted a view put forth by Pakistan's ISI (Inter-Services
Intelligence): the Islamic extremists in Afghanistan must be aided in their
struggle against the more educated, liberal, left-leaning classes.
On the advice of General Zia, the US decided to back the Afghan Islamist
party, headed by Gulb a-Din Hekmatyar. The CIA's intent was to place him
in charge of a front that would liberate Afghanistan from Soviet occupation.
The preference for Hekmatyar derived from his ethnic affiliation. His group,
the Pashtun, dwell on both sides of the Pakistani-Afghan border. It is
the biggest ethnic group in Afghanistan. Other leaders who initially fought
the Soviets, such as Burhan a-Din Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Masoud, both of
the Tajiki minority, failed to get the massive support from Pakistan that
Hekmatyar did. Another factor also weighed against them: they didn't seem
obedient enough. (Singh.)
In 1987, American military assistance to the Afghan rebels reached $700
million - more than Pakistan got. The CIA took care to equip them with
new high-grade weapons. Yet the agency took care, also, that the arms should
not come directly from the US. It wanted to obscure the American presence
in the area. (Digital
National Security Archive, 2001.) In order to diminish financial activity
between the US and Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia was engaged to transfer large
sums of money from its accounts, which the CIA managed behind the scenes.
When Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan, the country sank into civil
war. The various Muslim forces that had fought together could not agree
about apportioning power. Hekmatyar, still supported by Pakistan, failed
to capture Kabul, the capital. The battles between his forces and those
of his rival, Ahmad Shah Masoud, tore the country to pieces. Anarchy reigned.
II. The Taliban Conquest of Afghanistan
The Taliban movement has its origin in a network of religious schools,
established in Pakistan by another Islamist party, Jama'iyyat Ulama al-Islam.
In the early nineties, some four thousand madrassas (boarding schools)
sprang up all over Pakistan, especially near the Afghan border (where two
million Afghan refugees were living in camps). These schools included not
only refugee children, but also sons of wealthy Pakistani families. At
present they have half a million pupils. (Rashid.)
Until 1993 Jama'iyyat Ulama al-Islam was still a rather isolated party
in Pakistani politics. Then, however, it joined the government of Benazir
Bhutto. The coalition was headed by the Pakistani People's Party (PPP).
Under this aegis, the madrassas of Jama'iyyat Ulama al-Islam trained their
pupils within a military and political framework. Out of it came the Taliban
movement, under the supervision and responsibility of Pakistan's ISI.
In August 1994, the Pakistani regime decided to use the Taliban in order
to establish control over Afghanistan, where it intended to impose order
and stability. It sent the young fighters to carry out the task in which
Hekmatyar had failed. (Pakistan had become disenchanted with Hekmatyar
four years before in the Gulf crisis: he had taken a pro-Iraqi stance.
This had also angered his patrons, the Saudis.)
The chief of Jama'iyyat Ulama al-Islam, Mullah Fadel al-Rahman (once
head of the Pakistani parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee) at this time
made a series of visits to Saudi Arabia. His aim was to persuade the Saudis
to support the new Pakistani policy in Afghanistan. The head of the Saudi
secret service, Prince Turki al-Faisal, then paid a visit to the Taliban's
center at Kandahar in southern Afghanistan. Pakistan's pressure bore fruit:
the Saudis decided to finance the Taliban. (Hiro.)
They had an additional motive to do so. Jama'iyyat Ulama al-Islam and
the Taliban belong to an Islamic school of thought known as Deoband, named
after the Indian town where it was founded in 1867. This school is based
on a separatist, reactionary interpretation of Islam. Deoband is very close
to the Wahabi school, to which the Saudi royal family belongs.
The US joined its allies in aiding the Taliban movement, ignoring
its cruelty toward Afghan citizens. Washington pursued a single objective
only: control over the oil and gas resources in the Caspian Sea. On September
26, 1996, after seven years of civil war, the Taliban captured Kabul, the
capital. They imposed their authority and secured, for a short time, a
measure of stability.(Maroofi.)
One year later a contract was signed between, on the one hand, a group
of oil companies including America's Unocal and Saudi Arabia's Delta Oil,
and, on the other, the government of Turkmenistan (formerly a Soviet republic).
The agreement included the laying of a pipeline 790 km. long, from the
gas fields of Turkmenistan on the Caspian Sea to the Indian Ocean. The
pipeline was supposed to pass through Afghanistan and Pakistan, enabling
the Americans to bypass Iran and Russia. The Taliban government promised
Pakistan to keep the area around the pipeline stable. (Haque.)
Trud, a Russian newspaper, quoted the assistant director of
Unocal, Chris Taggart, on October 29, 1997 as follows: "If Taliban stabilizes
the situation in Afghanistan and can gain international recognition, the
possibilities of constructing a pipeline will be significantly improved."
In August 1998, the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar al-Salam
were bombed. The attacks were linked to Osama Bin Laden, now based in Afghanistan
under the aegis of the Taliban government. Three months later, Unocal canceled
its part in the pipeline deal.
The Taliban victory in Afghanistan resulted not from divine intervention,
rather from the support of Pakistan's army and secret service, together
with American and Saudi money. In less abnormal circumstances, even all
these would not have sufficed. One more element was required: Afghanistan's
sheer backwardness. Were it not for that, a movement with so benighted
an interpretation of Islam could never have taken over. This movement could
only find footing in a country lacking the infrastructure of modern life.
III. A utopian plan to restore the caliphate
In 1995 Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was visiting Ethiopia when an
attempt was made on his life. It was linked to associates of Osama Bin
Laden, then in Sudan. Egypt and Saudi Arabia brought pressure to bear on
Sudan, which expelled Bin Laden. He returned to Afghanistan in May 1996.
On September 26, Taliban forces entered Kabul and took control of the country.
The intimate relation between Bin Laden and the Taliban did not result
from any interest on his part in the welfare of the Afghan people. The
need to restore the ravaged land had no place on his agenda. On the contrary,
devastation and backwardness provided fertile soil for his megalomaniac
program: to turn Afghanistan into a major base of jihad fighters for the
sake of Islamic conquest.
The Taliban movement did not establish a modern system of government.
It did not aim to solve the economic and social crisis, caused by years
of war and drought. Instead, through a special police system, it set about
enforcing its reactionary Wahabi version of Islam. The new laws proscribed,
among other things, listening to music or making art. Afghan women paid
the highest price. The Taliban forbade them to study or work or even, except
under strictly defined conditions, to go out of doors.
The Taliban did bring relative stability, however, which stopped the
flow of refugees to Pakistan. This neighbor viewed the new government in
a favorable light and acted as its patron. To Pakistan, a friendly Afghanistan
is a source of strategic depth. It provides vital help in the confrontation
with India over the control of central Asia. In particular, the Taliban
jihad fighters reinforce pro-Pakistan troops in disputed Kashmir. In the
border battles of May 1999, between India and Pakistan, Bin Laden's forces
played a major role.
Thus, despite its poverty and devastation, Afghanistan has become a
crucial zone for regional and global interests. The Taliban government,
for its part, has chained the Afghan people to its struggle for the Islamic
nation. The aim is nothing less than to impose its reactionary version
of Islam on a global scale. For starters, it did not balk at cooperation
with America. The jihad fighters joined Uncle Sam in conflicts ranging
from the Balkans through Chechnya to the Philippines. Osama Bin Laden and
the Taliban developed a symbiotic relationship. The latter adopted the
former's utopian program, according to which all Muslims should unite beneath
a restored caliphate. They should rid the Muslim world of infidels and
cancel national borders. The effect of Bin Laden's vision would be to isolate
the Muslim world. He believes he can only achieve this goal by the violent
overthrow of existing Arab regimes. His organizational tool is the al-Qaeda
movement. This arose during the anti-Soviet revolt, as a means of coordinating
Arab volunteers who came to help the Afghans.
Bin Laden has outlined his program to the Al-Jazeera television network.
He wants to restore the type of regime that existed under the "Rashidun
caliphate". (The term refers to the first four successors of the Prophet
Muhammad; they are considered to have been righteous men, compared to the
corrupt and divided leaders of later periods.) Unlike other Muslim visionaries,
however, Bin Laden intends to put his program into practice at once, beginning
with the Arab world but not stopping there. He wants, that is, to replace
the existing global regime with an Islamic one.
In his desire to change the world, Bin Laden does not contemplate a
protracted process of persuasion; he does not seek to build an alternative
with a broad social base and a political organization. He does not believe
in mobilizing the masses to the point where they will be ready to overthrow
the regime. His approach is rather the shortcut known as jihad. Only thus,
he believes, will he awaken the oppressed to action. He counts on the despair
and frustration to which American policies have led during the last decade.
Yet without a firm social alternative, despair and frustration have never
sufficed to change reality.
Despite the dramatic effects of the recent terrorist attacks, there
is nothing new in their underlying concept: a group of extremists undertook
a spectacular act, aimed at arousing the masses to action. The same concept
guided the Bader-Meinhof group in Germany, the Red Brigades in Italy and
the Montoneros in Argentina. Such organizations, whether left or right,
were far removed ideologically from the Islam of Osama Bin Laden. Yet all
shared a belief that terror would pave the way for change. All shared,
that is, the quality of impatience. Their end was abject failure. Their
adventurist tactics enabled the authorities to isolate and eliminate them.
Their terrorist acts provided a pretext to put down, in addition, more
patient revolutionary movements, which were engaged in the slow work of
building a true alternative.
In contrast with the communist parties, the radical groups, misinterpreting
Marx, sought to take power solely through armed struggle. Violent actions
were to replace the mobilization of the masses, trade unions and political
parties. Bin Laden has learned nothing from the dismal fate of the "leftist
jihad", whose fighters were no less devoted than his. The hatred and spite
that he harbors toward the working class, or anything that smacks of socialism,
have prevented his learning from others' experience. He is leading his
supporters to a similar doom.
IV. Decline of the global jihad
In February 1998, Bin Laden and Aiman al-Zawahari, leader of Egypt's Islamic
jihad, united various Islamic groups under a single roof: "The Global Islamic
Front Against the Jews and the Crusaders." Clerics who identified with
the Front published a fatwa (a decree of Islamic law), stating: "To kill
Americans and their allies, civilian or military, is an obligation for
every Muslim capable of doing so, wherever possible. This decree will be
in effect until the liberation of the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Holy Mosque
(in Mecca - YBE) and until their armies withdraw from all the lands of
Islam." (al-Quds al-Arabi, February 1998). This decree was a desperate
measure. It was meant to revive the jihad groups, whose status, for reasons
we shall now explore, had been severely shaken in the Arab world.
1. The failure of jihad in Algeria
After the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, about ten thousand
Arab volunteers who had fought with the Afghan rebels found themselves
idle. Under the leadership and guidance of Bin Laden, they established
a secret network of armed activists in several lands. The first target
was Algeria, whose army, in 1991, had grabbed power in a coup against the
party that had won that year's election, namely, the "Front for Islamic
Salvation". Five years after this coup, the GIA ("Armed Islamic Groups")
appeared in Algeria. It was subject to Bin Laden. It proclaimed a jihad
against the Algerian army and its rural militias. In the subsequent fighting,
both sides massacred innocent Muslims by the hundreds of thousands. The
blood of civilians flowed until the autumn of 1997, when the Front for
Islamic Salvation declared a cease fire. The GIA refused to accept it,
continuing its terrorist operations. This resulted in its isolation and
repudiation by the Algerian masses. (Benramdane.)
2. … and in Egypt
The fate of jihad groups in Egypt was no different. Their terrorist
acts failed to overthrow the regime. At first they tried unsuccessfully
to assassinate government officials. In a later phase, they killed tourists.
In addition to destroying lives, these assaults caused serious economic
damage, for tourism is Egypt's main source of foreign currency. The jihad
fighters also made terrorist attacks on the Copts, a Christian minority
in Egypt, in an attempt to awaken inter-religious hostilities. But the
Egyptian public turned its back on such extremism. It gave its support,
instead, to the more moderate Islamic school, which seeks to ally itself
with the regime. The activists of the moderate Islamic movements make up
an important part of the Egyptian economic elite. They hold numerous jobs
in government administration, religious institutions, universities, trade
unions and non-profit associations. Their offices connect them to the regime.
As a matter of course, these activists have influence with the masses.
They have managed to isolate the jihad groups, preventing them from overturning
the government.
3. … and in Sudan
The heaviest blow to the jihad movement came in Sudan. At first things
went superlatively. In 1989 Sheikh Hassan Turabi and General Omar Bashir
conducted a military coup against the country's democratically-elected
government. The new regime invited Osama Bin Laden to live and work in
Sudan. In the mid-1990's, however, General Bashir began warming up to the
West. He banished Bin Laden in 1996. Three years later he placed Turabi
himself under house arrest. In the same period, the regime permitted the
CIA to open offices in Sudan.
4. …and in Arab lands
The jihad groups also failed to make progress in Arab countries. This
fact shows the difference between the reality in those countries and that
in Afghanistan. The masses of the Arab lands rejected all attempts to impose
Islamic dictatorship. The workers, the peasants and the liberal intelligentsia
are simply not willing to enter a Dark Age of fanaticism.
5. … and beyond
The jihad forces have also attempted to impose their vision outside
the Arab world, but with little success. Their apparent achievements in
Bosnia and Kosovo did not come about because of superlative military capability.
Their interests coincided temporarily with those of the West, that was
all. This collaboration was based on a common desire to reduce Russian
influence by dismantling the Yugoslav federation. One expression of this
strange harmony occurred in Israel. The government of Yitzhak Rabin joined
hands with the local Islamic movement in 1993, absorbing dozens of Muslim
refugees from Bosnia. The Islamic movement lost its enthusiasm, however,
upon discovering that the refugees were blond and secular. Finally, the
kibbutzim took them in.
The jihad groups also suffered defeat in Chechnya and Dagastan. Here
the Mujahidin operated in response to the call of America, which wanted
to secure control of the oil-rich Caspian Sea. Under American protégé
Boris Yeltsin, Russia was passive. The dismemberment of Yugoslavia, its
historic ally, had continued with impunity. This passivity stopped, however,
as soon as the American slicing machine threatened the Caucasus. Under
pressure of Russian public opinion, Yeltsin refused an American demand
to place international observers in Chechnya. Soon after that he resigned,
yielding power to Vladimir Putin (who promised not to use incriminating
material against him). Putin then launched a campaign to wipe out the Chechnyan
rebels. Riding on a wave of nationalist enthusiasm, he won support from
the Russian people, who felt humiliated by the decline in their country's
international status. He achieved the acme of popularity when he conquered
Grozni, the Chechnyan capital, and ground it to bits.
For the jihad, then, things did not go so well here as they had in Bosnia
and Kosovo. Extremist Islam failed elsewhere as well. In May 1999, Pakistan's
army worked together with the Taliban and Bin Laden's jihad fighters in
a joint attack on the province of Kashmir in India. It ended in dismal
defeat.
On all fronts, then, Osama Bin Laden's jihad fighters lost ground.
The attacks on America occurred after their movement had reached a dead
end. They hoped to recoup prestige by a sensational action. It would catalyze
the necessary confrontation with the Infidels. At its end, they believed,
would come Redemption.
V. Operation "Day of Judgment"
The Islamic awakening did not progress at the rate Osama Bin Laden desired.
At the same time, however, the status of the US itself declined in the
Arab and Muslim worlds. Popular rage against America (and Israel) came
to a head in October 2000, when the masses went into the streets in support
of the Intifada. Bin Laden did not ignore this. These energies, he understood,
were directed not only against Israel and Washington, but also against
America's Arab allies, above all Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
Massive demonstrations broke out in the whole Arab world, including
the Gulf states, and among the Arabs in Israel. The opposition to America
focused on three issues: (1) Its one-sided support for Israel against the
Palestinians; (2) its sanctions against Iraq; and (3) its support for India
against Pakistan. Behind these issues lay a broader background of unemployment,
poverty and backwardness.
Arab public opinion made it difficult for the regimes to maintain open,
friendly relations with the US. As soon as the Intifada broke out, they
hastened to convene an Arab summit - the first since the Gulf War - to
deflect the criticism. They changed their line to save their skins. Egypt
and the Gulf States had established diplomatic and economic relations with
Israel during the nineties. They had supported the Palestinian surrender
at Oslo. Now, suddenly, they launched a crude propaganda campaign against
Israel and America. The campaign has lasted a year. It has included most
of the Arab media, from newspapers to satellite TV. It has filled an important
function in awakening popular feeling to identify with the Intifada. Within
Arab public opinion, it has created the impression of an imminent war against
"the Jews and Crusaders".
Islamist forces did score points on the Israeli front, although without
connection to Bin Laden. First, under the military pressure of the Hizballah
(the Islamic "Party of God"), Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon in
May 2000. Fanatical Islamic organizations continued to carry out suicide
attacks inside the country. These successes tended to nourish, among extremists,
the feeling that the moment of decision was near. Islam seemed capable
of leading the faithful to victory. In the upsurge of faith, the real balance
of forces was forgotten.
There are fundamental differences between the terrorist actions in New
York and Washington, on the one hand, and the struggle of Hizballah and
Hamas on the other. The latter carefully avoid any damage to American interests.
They act within a carefully defined political framework. The Hizballah
coordinate their actions with Syria and Iran; they claim legitimacy from
international law. As for Hamas, it rarely strays beyond "red lines" established
by the PA (Palestinian Authority). When it does, the PA arrests
its leaders. The attacks on America, in contrast, were not intended to
liberate conquered territory or achieve a well-defined practical end. The
intent was more grandiose than that: to create strategic parity between
the Islamic world and that of the Infidel. What kind of framework, then,
is guiding Bin Laden? What are his "red lines"? How does he dare to launch
an attack such as far greater powers would never dream of? We should recall,
first, that he and his companions believed they had recently defeated the
Soviet Union. Furthermore, although Bin Laden considered the forces at
his disposal and weighed his steps, his assessments were off. We have mentioned
the strategic depth that Afghanistan gives Pakistan in the latter's conflict
with India. Bin Laden apparently believed that Pakistan, in turn, would
provide him with strategic depth in his jihad against "Crusader" America.
What could have led him to such a miscalculation? Did he really believe
that Pakistan would stand with him? Apparently. Behind his mistake lay
two events: the Islamic bomb and the coup by General Pervez Musharaf.
(1) On May 28, 1998 Pakistan carried out a successful nuclear test.
This had a tremendous effect on the Muslim states in the region, including
the fundamentalist movements. Saudi Arabia was among the first to cheer.
Much of its enthusiasm derived from the fact that its two major enemies,
Iraq and Iran, are well underway toward developing their own.
In the three years since that event, Pakistanis have observed each May
28 as "The Great Day": the anniversary of the first successful nuclear
test by an Islamic state. In the Great Day celebrations of the year 2000,
the Pakistani Minister of Science declared, "We bow down before God Almighty,
who restored her greatness to Pakistan on May 28, 1998." (Goldberg.)
Sami ul-Haq, who heads Jama'iyyat Ulama al-Islam and serves in Pakistan's
parliament, has published a fatwa declaring jihad against any Pakistani
government that signs an agreement preventing nuclear tests. Ul-Haq, a
fervent supporter of Bin Laden, also heads a religious school. Many of
his graduates have joined the Taliban. The Associated Press reported in
October 1998 as follows: "Many militants want Pakistan to continue development
of nuclear weapons, both as a deterrent to longtime enemy India and as
an equalizer for the Islamic world in its dealings with the West." (Gannon.)
Muslim extremists interpreted Pakistan's nuclear tests as a gift from heaven.
God granted them the bomb as a thing to use. The West had tried to prevent
Islam from getting what others in Asia, Europe and America had, but Pakistan's
success ended that.
Bin Laden and his organization now awaited their chance to declare a
jihad against America. The Musharaf coup, to which we now turn, signaled
for them the approach of Judgment Day.
(2) At the time of the nuclear test, Nawaz Sharif was still president
of Pakistan. He tried to reach agreement with India over Kashmir. Behind
his back, General Pervez Musharaf led the army and the jihad militias,
attacking inside that province. He meant to torpedo the pending agreement.
Like all Pakistani generals, Musharaf feared that a treaty with India would
weaken the army's domestic position. This army draws its power and influence
from a strange mix of modern arms and Muslim extremism, aimed against the
arch-infidels, India and America.
The Musharaf offensive ended in failure, as I have mentioned. Pakistanis
blamed the defeat on a change in American policy. Until the Clinton Administration,
the US had sided with them. But Clinton had switched sides, favoring India.
This had outraged the Pakistani public, as well as the army. Bin Laden
compared the switch to America's preference for Israel over the Palestinians.
In October 1999, Musharaf deposed Sharif. An ultra-nationalist was now
at the helm in Pakistan, backed by an army with strong Islamic connections.
Behind Osama Bin Laden's miscalculation, then, lay three beliefs: First,
Pakistan with its nuclear bomb could function as an independent Islamic
power, giving him strategic depth against "Jews and Crusaders". Second,
Musharaf would surely support him. And third, as mentioned, there was the
abiding conviction that he and his colleagues had done it before: they
had (with a little help from their American friends) defeated one superpower
already.
VI. Saudi Arabia - The Weak Link
To understand America's difficulty in coping with the Bin Laden phenomenon,
we need to explore the complex relations between the US and Saudi Arabia.
We have mentioned the latter's cooperation with the CIA in financing the
Afghan Mujahidin. With the passage of time, however, a conflict of interest
has developed between Riyadh and Washington. After the attacks on the American
embassies in Nairobi and Dar al-Salam (August 1998), the US retaliated
against Bin Laden's bases in Afghanistan, as well as a pharmaceutical factory
in Sudan (which it claimed was making chemical weapons). On February 8,
1999, the New York Times quoted CIA Director George Tenet as telling Congress
that Bin Laden could strike "at any time" against symbols of American power.
The Times noted a consensus, among US policy makers, "that Bin Laden has
strong political support even among American allies abroad." He "receives
money and political support from princes of the Saudi royal family, whose
king he has vowed to depose, and from powerful people and financial institutions
in Kuwait and Qatar, where there is a strong American military presence,
U.S. officials said." (Weiner.)
Washington wasn't blind to the seriousness of the situation. Concerns
about Saudi Arabia's ambivalent relation to America had begun to grow after
June 25, 1996. On that date an explosion in an American base at Khobar
in Saudi Arabia killed 19 US soldiers. The Saudi government refused to
cooperate with Washington in investigating the incident. On the contrary,
the Saudis did all they could to conceal information and keep the Americans
from gathering evidence. To this day, five years later, the incident at
Khobar remains a mystery. No one has been brought to trial. Louis Freeh,
head of the FBI, "gave an example of how the Americans were cold-shouldered:
the Chevrolet used in the attack had been found at the start of July 1996,
but it took more than six months and the most highly-placed intercessions
before the FBI was allowed to examine the vehicle." (Middle
East International.)
Saudi Arabia attempted to create the impression that Iran-backed Shi'ites
had made the attack. Its version did not persuade Washington. On July 6,
2001 the Al-Jazeera television network broadcast a talk show called "More
Than One View" (Aktar min Rai), including Saudi and Iranian participants.
They exposed several important facts concerning the attack in Khobar. Dr.
Sa'ad al-Fakiyya, head of the Islamic Reform Movement in Saudi Arabia,
called in to say, "Let's be clear. A group of six Sunni Muslims was arrested
in connection with the attack at Khobar. Their link to it has in effect
been proved. These six… aren't the only ones. Hundreds were arrested after
the attack, in a wide-ranging action that brought in everyone who was thought
to be a supporter or who had any connection whatever to the war in Afghanistan."
Dr. al-Fakiyya explained why the Saudis kept the Americans from investigating:
"If this group or another, in the attacks at Riyadh or Khobar, is shown
to be connected to Bin Laden, it will demonstrate that there is a local
Sunni group opposing the regime and threatening its stability. The Saudi
fear of such a revelation led them, instead, to blame the Shi'ite opposition."
The program host, Sami Hadad, added the following: "In October 1998,
the French News Agency cited a source in the Saudi Interior Ministry, who
said that the Saudis had expelled the Taliban representatives because their
government was sheltering people wanted in connection with the attack at
Khobar." The Assistant Editor of al-Shark al-Awsat, Muhammad Awam, confirmed
this claim.
How did the Khobar attack affect relations with America? According
to the International Herald Tribune ("Saudi Arabia: The Ties That
Bind," December 2, 1996), a senior US official admitted: 'Saudi Arabia
is a black hole. We have enormous gaps in understanding what is going on
here.' After the Khobar attack, the CIA subjected the kingdom to an exceptional
analysis procedure known as 'hard target strategy' (until then reserved
for countries like Russia, China, Iran, Iraq and North Korea) to try to
assess the dangers weighing down on the regime."
The CIA did manage, however, to investigate why the Khobar attackers
weren't brought to trial, but it refrained from publishing the results.
We may hazard a guess as to why: the US discovered how much the political
opposition to the Saudi regime has been growing. Maybe Washington finally
understood, too, that there is broad antagonism to its military presence
on Saudi soil. If the CIA did its homework, it found out that the opposition
to the regime is nourished by a decline in social and economic conditions.
The bitterness of the people increases because of corruption in the royal
family, whose members carry on a life of ostentatious luxury at a time
when most Saudis are suffering. Since 1982, when King Fahd came to the
throne, the economy has shrunk drastically. "In 1993, annual per capita
income was $5,000, barely one third of what it was in the early 1980's.
By some estimates, it has since fallen still further. And politically,
all this has aided Islamic fundamentalism, which has grown at an alarming
rate because it is the only popular movement which the government cannot
outlaw." (Aburish.)
Whatever the results of the CIA investigation, it is clear what Washington
decided to do in the wake of the Khobar attack: keep mum. At the same time,
it seems, Saudi Arabia reached understandings with the Taliban and Bin
Laden. The latter agreed to cease attacking inside the Saudi borders. In
return, the Saudis would continue to provide financial support and refrain
from bringing the Khobar attackers to trial. We have no proof of such understandings,
but the fact is, terrorist activity did stop inside the country until an
explosion in Khobar at the start of October 2001, after the attacks on
America. (Here too the pattern has repeated itself: investigation has yielded
no publicly visible results.)
The events of September 11 put an end to Washington's hesitations. The
main editorial in the New York Times for September 25 called on the Saudi
government to cooperate with American intelligence in order to uproot the
terrorist organizations on Saudi soil, as well as their financial sources.
This call amounted to an admission of now undeniable facts: Saudi Arabia
gives shelter and support to extremist Islamic groups, fearing that confrontation
will doom a regime that is already on the edge.
Twelve of the suicide fighters in the attacks on America came from Saudi
Arabia. This fact carries grave implications for the Saudi regime. Its
officials have tried to blur it by saying that the published names are
inexact. They keep American journalists from entering their country. Despite
the attempts at obfuscation, it is certain that most of the Saudi suicide-attackers
came from the poverty-stricken region of Assir (in the southern part of
the country, near the border with Yemen). Here live a number of tribes
that are known to oppose the regime. (Murphy.)
Three years before the attacks on America, in October 1998, Le Monde
Diplomatique published the following analysis: "The Saudi model of alliance
between conservative Islamic fundamentalism and the West has failed. The
problem for Washington is that it has no alternative political strategy
vis-à-vis the Muslim world. On the Saudi side, the double talk of
Prince Turki, a convinced pro-American who has always supported the radical
Sunni movements and was still with the Taliban in the spring of this year,
is reaching its limits. Riyadh is spending large sums of money to fund
Islamist networks that actually feel nothing but contempt for the emirs
and their petrodollars and think the Islamic State of Saudi Arabia would
be even more Islamic without the Saud dynasty."
(Roy.)
The "Prince Turki" in question is Turki al-Faisal, for thirty years
head of Saudi intelligence and architect of the kingdom's close relations
with the Islamist movements. These relations started with the alliance
against the Soviets in Afghanistan and continued on their lethal course
until September 11. (Tyler.)
Now they have reached a dead end. Curiously, Prince Turki resigned or was
sacked (no outsider knows) just before the attacks, on August 31; this
has led to speculation that the Saudi regime may have known that something
was afoot.
VII. America with no alternative
It isn't easy to grasp what alternative America has in relation to Afghanistan,
perhaps because she has none. That is why Washington delayed its military
response for almost a month. Even today it is hard to define the purposes
of this war or the standards by which to measure success or failure. It
seems strange that to catch one man and his followers hiding in caves,
a great power moves aircraft carriers and army divisions across vast seas.
This war was imposed on America. Bin Laden and Afghanistan were by no
means on its agenda. Many of the organizations and people labeled "terrorist"
after September 11 had been known to the US Administration for quite some
time. They had operated in America and Europe without interference. Some
of Bin Laden's associates, for example, though sentenced to death by Egypt,
won political asylum in Britain, where they engaged in media activities
and ran a ramified financial network. Before September 11, Washington did
not view the massacres of Algerians by the hundreds of thousands, or the
murders of tourists in Egypt, as a grave enough problem to justify outlawing
or restraining these organizations.
Before September 11, in fact, the foreign policy of the United States
was directed mainly against Russia. America views Russia as a nuclear power
that competes with it for influence in the vital areas of central Europe,
the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf. As for Bin Laden, he was not considered
as serious a threat as "rogue states" like Iran, Iraq and North Korea.
The main strategic initiative of George W. Bush was to cancel the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty of 1972 and increase the effort to build an anti-missile
defense system, which was supposed to ensure supremacy over Russia. Although
he has not given this up, the attack on America has shifted priorities
and changed the political map.
The New York Times, on September 27, exposed a small part of the web
that America had woven around Russia: "Russia has helped decisively in
preparations for any military action in Afghanistan and today it was rewarded.
The United States, in a clear shift, stated for the first time that the
Al Qaeda network played a role in inciting the bloody rebellion in the
Russian territory of Chechnya." This new position signifies a sharp turn
in the American attitude toward Russia. Just a few months ago, during his
election campaign, Bush threatened to cut off aid to Russia because of
its attacks on Chechnya. During a television interview in February 2000,
Bush said, "This guy, Putin, who is now the temporary president, has come
to power as a result of Chechnya." He added that Putin dealt with Chechnya
in a way "that's not acceptable to peaceful nations." (Dau.)
Why only now does Washington acknowledge the role Bin Laden played in
the Chechnyan uprising? The answer is simple. Earlier, the US was interested
mainly in besmirching Russia's name and undermining its influence. Osama
Bin Laden seemed a minor problem.
The aid that America gave the Taliban in Afghanistan was a product of
the same strategy. It was the Taliban's role to guarantee an American foothold
in the three Muslim states that border the Caspian Sea and are presently
under Russian influence: Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. The US
preferred the Taliban regime in Afghanistan because of its absolute dependence
on Pakistan. The alternative "Northern Alliance", supported by Russia and
Iran, was repugnant to American eyes.
Despite Washington's present use of the Northern Alliance as a lever
against the Taliban, it does not see the former as a strategic partner.
Nor does it want to create antagonism with its devoted allies in Pakistan
and Saudi Arabia. Thus its anti-Taliban stance at first led Iran to support
the American cry for revenge. Soon enough, however, Iran sensed the way
the wind was blowing: it joined the opposition to the US attacks on Afghanistan.
Washington is determined to eliminate Bin Laden and stabilize the Afghan
regime without disturbing the regional balance. If it succeeds in this,
it will continue its Crusade to liberate the sacred Caspian oil fields.
It will seek to bring other nearby lands, such as Georgia, into its orbit.
VIII. The War and the Global Economic Downturn
The roots of the "first war of the 21st century" may be found in the wars
America waged in the 1990's against Iraq and Yugoslavia. It fought against
countries that could offer no resistance, military or economic. It paraded
these wars under enlightened titles such as the defense of ethnic groups,
of human rights, of democracy. Their single purpose, however, was to enforce
a new world order, commanded by the United States. The wars resulted in
a great many victims, the destruction of nation-states, and structural
destabilization on a global scale.
That destabilization was the topic of an article in Le Monde Diplomatique
(June
1999): "When the cold war came to an end, civil conflicts in the developing
world did not. On the contrary they redoubled in intensity. Since the fall
of the Berlin Wall (1989) more than 23 situations of internal warfare have
appeared, or been reactivated - with more than 50 armed groups involved…In
many countries (for instance Angola, Somalia and Sierra Leone) the destructiveness
of these ongoing national conflicts follows a pattern. … Rebel groups vie
with each other for a monopoly of violence, previously the prerogative
of the state. When this happens, the developing nation-state implodes and
turns into an ungovernable chaotic entity. …Whole sectors of the economy,
towns, provinces and regions fall under the yoke of new warlords, drug
traffickers or mafia. This is currently the case in Afghanistan…" The article
goes on to name fourteen more "ungovernable chaotic entities," including
Somalia, Kosovo, Bosnia, Chechnya and Haiti. (De
Rivero.)
Soon the West Bank and Gaza may join the list, as a result of the American-sponsored
Oslo Accords. Structural instability is the consequence of a global economic
regime that furthers the interests of big industrial concerns, above all
the oil companies. Since 1997, the world has teetered on the edge of economic
crisis. This causes direct damage to two kinds of countries: those with
medium-sized economies, such as Brazil, Argentina and the East Asian "tigers";
and poor ones like Egypt. The enormous popular rage against America derives
from the ravages caused by its new world order. Millions of people all
over the world find themselves left out of the global economy, with neither
income nor future.
The use of force to impose hegemony is a sign of weakness. It shows
that the global capitalist regime is nearing collapse. Anarchy in weaker
lands may be taken as the first sparrow. For the past two years, however,
the crisis has been hitting the big industrial centers. Japan, Europe and
America itself were slipping into recession even before the attacks on
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. These came as a rude awakening:
the malignancy has not stayed locked up within the borders of Africa, Asia
or Latin America. It has found its way to the nerve-center of the capitalist
order.
The present and future anarchy does not know borders. New technology
and high-speed transportation, the vital organs of globalization, constitute
a two-edged sword. With all the good they have done, especially for the
multinationals, they also made it possible for nineteen fundamentalist
extremists to go to flying school and strike at the heart of America.
The attack on the US is a warning. The lack of any alternative on a
global scale raises unprecedented dangers. The beginnings of disarray can
be seen already, in the cracks that have opened among the former members
of the alliance against Iraq. They do not go along with the American notion
that problems can be solved by force. They worry that they too may become
a target for rage, with anarchy popping up in their own backyards.
The enemy is evasive. It is not just Bin Laden or the Taliban. The real
enemy is the anarchy America itself has created. The present war will strengthen
this anarchy. The economic crisis, meanwhile, sharpens conflicts of interest
among the more influential states. There is growing danger of nuclear confrontation
between China and Taiwan, India and Pakistan, and yes, America and Russia.
Nor can we ignore the rebirth of fascism in Europe. Fascists again stalk
the corridors of power in Italy and Austria. Our world, in short, has gone
astray. Bin Laden and his followers have reminded us how far. But the primary
problem is not terrorism. Society lacks, at present, the will to heal the
gravest illness humanity has ever known: the epidemic of poverty. This
is not a poverty caused by overpopulation, drought or famine. It is a poverty
resulting from an unbounded drive to profit at the expense of others.
Epilogue
Soon after the suicide actions, the New Statesman, a British weekly close
to the Labor Party, included the following analysis in its lead editorial
(Sept. 17, 2001). "Since the communist bloc began to weaken in the 1980s,
and finally collapsed in the 1990s, capitalism has reverted to type, though
with most of the misery exported from the industrialized nations. A world
in which there is only one superpower deprives poor countries of the best
lever for improving themselves that they ever had: if one side wouldn't
provide aid, in cash or kind, they could go straight to the other. True,
this kind of blackmail allowed many cruel and corrupt dictators to retain
power. But you may be sure that, if the Soviet Union were still a reality
and a threat, the debt crisis, which now affects some 50 countries and
has reached previously unimagined levels (some countries have to use a
quarter of their export earnings to service debt), would not exist….The
death of the Soviet Union also deprived the global poor of something more
intangible: not exactly hope, perhaps, but the sense of an alternative,
of possibility."
These points are clearly beyond the comprehension of Osama Bin Laden
and his band. When he called on Muslims to wage a jihad against American
bases in Saudi Arabia, against the siege on Iraq and against the oppression
of the Palestinians, he forgot one thing: it was he and his followers who
helped bring down the Soviet Union - and who bear, therefore, responsibility
for the ills he rails against.
How otherwise explain the fact that until the fall of the Soviet Union,
the Americans couldn't get a foot in the regional door? How otherwise explain
the fact that until this event, forty years had gone by and no country
had dared fire ballistic missiles on another's cities? How otherwise explain
the fact that the Palestinian people felt forced to accept an agreement
amounting to surrender? Who would ever have imagined, before the fall of
the Soviet Union, that Arab states would stand by America in a war against
Iraq? Or that they would let the option of war against Israel be swept
from their hands?
In Lebanon in the early 1980s, when Palestinians resisted Israel and
received support from the Soviet Union, Bin Laden (with Saudi help) gave
America a gift in Afghanistan. Instead of defending the oppressed, he struck
at their ally. If the Arab volunteers in Afghanistan had really wanted
to sacrifice themselves, they could have gone to Beirut when it was under
siege, at a time when the Palestinians and Lebanese desperately needed
Arab solidarity. Why didn't they go? Because the war in Beirut, unlike
that in Afghanistan, was being fought against American imperialism, and
this didn't fit their concept. Osama Bin Laden "beat" communism, but the
victory was a Pyrrhic one, and the first of its victims was the Palestinian
people.
Not just this people, however, but all peoples of the world are paying
the price for the Soviet demise. The greatest endeavor in human history
here met its end. Absurdly enough, the capitalist regime too pays the price
for its downfall. The Soviet Union had ensured a measure of political and
economic stability in many lands. Upon its collapse, responsibility passed
to the United States.
The current global problem, however, is not the fact that there is
just one superpower, but the absence of a significant organized political
opposition within that superpower. The US prides itself on being the stronghold
of democracy. What is this democracy? A coterie shuffles power among its
members. Around this magic circle the media form a consensus of specious
reasonableness, in which the human causes of massive suffering pass as
immutable laws.
One result of the lack of broad-based opposition in the US has been
the rise of extremist tendencies in the rest of the world. While Americans
huddled cozily, enjoying their "way of life," others have been in decline.
It is no wonder, therefore, that the poor of the earth, among them Islamic
peoples, have developed a deep hatred for America. Its exploitation of
them for the sake of its standard of living, accompanied by indifference
to their catastrophes, has led to the present state of things, where the
US has become a target. A true response to the recent events, on the part
of the American people, would be to take a stand - and offer at last an
alternative to the coterie that got them into this mess. It is not accidental
that the movement against globalization began in Seattle in 1999. This
was a good beginning toward building an alternative. But the recent suicide
actions have caught the anti-globalization movement unprepared. Its lack
of readiness shows in the absence of a clear political program to counter
capitalism.
The earth-shaking events of September 11 should make it possible for
popular movements in the industrial nations, and especially in the US,
to put politics back on the public agenda. America still has its masses,
its working class, its unions. It is upon them to put forth a new position,
blocking reactionary trends that threaten to cast the world into anarchy.
As Marxists, we attempt to understand the contradictions of the capitalist
regime and to work for its downfall. Acts of suicidal murder contribute
nothing toward this difficult goal. Our way is long, requiring patience
and persistent labor. Our purpose is to persuade the masses and to organize
them within the framework of political parties, until they are able to
realize their democratic right to determine their own fate.
Politics must be put back on the public agenda, not as an end in itself,
but as a means to return society's resources to society's hands. These
resources ought to be distributed equally among all peoples, so that each
may feel itself to be part of humanity. If this does not happen, what we
saw on September 11 will turn out to be part of an ongoing series. Between
socialism and barbarism there is no third alternative. The time has come
to choose.
- Translated from the Hebrew by Stephen Langfur.
Sources:
Aburish, Said. "The Coming Arab Crash," Mid-East
Realities, October 19, 2001, <www.MiddleEast.Org> Back
to text.
Alavi, Hamza. "Pakistan And Islam: Ethnicity
and Ideology" in Fred Halliday and Hamza Alavi (eds.), State and Ideology
in the Middle East and Pakistan, London & New York, 1988. Back
to text.
Benramdane, Djamel. "Election Shrouded in
Confusion: Algeria accepts the unacceptable." Le Monde Diplomatique,
March 1999 Back to text.
Dau, James. "U.S Says Military Strikes Are Just
a Part of Big Plan," New York Times, Sept. 27, 2001. Back
to text.
De Rivero, Oswaldo. "States in Ruin, Conflicts
Without End: The Economics of Future Chaos." Le Monde Diplomatique,
June 1999. Back to text.
Digital National Security Archive, 2001.
<http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com> Back to
text(1).
Back to text(2).
Gannon, Kathy. "Strict religious schools maintain
hold on Pakistan society." The Associated Press, October 12, 1998.
<www.nandotimes.com>. Back to text.
Goldberg, Jeffrey. "Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam,
Sami-ul-Haq faction or JUI/S." Diario El Pais, S.L., Madrid, Spain.
Sept. 16, 2001. Back to text.
Haque, Ihtashamul. "Withdrawal of Unocal: Turkmen
gas pipeline project in jeopardy." Dawn, December 23, 1998. Back
to text.
Hiro, Dilip. "Politics-Afghanistan: Foreign
Arms Sustain Afghan Civil War." IPS News Reports. <www.ips.org>.
Back to text.
Maroofi, Musa M. "The Afghan Taliban: Like
It or Not, It Occupies Two-Thirds of Afghanistan and Shows No Sign of Weakening."
American Educational Trust, April 1998. Back to
text.
Middle East International. London, March 7, 1997,
quoting an article by Elaine Sciolino in the New York Times. Back
to text.
Murphy, Caryle and David B. Ottaway. "Some
Light Shed On Saudi Suspects." Washington Post, September 25, 2001.
Back
to text.
Rashid, Ahmed. "Cracks in the Caucasus and
Central Asia: Taliban stir up regional instability." Le Monde Diplomatique,
November 1999. Back to text.
Roy, Olivier. "Hazy Outlines of an Islamist International:
Fundamentalists without a common cause." Le Monde Diplomatique,
October 1998. Back to text.
Singh, Uma. "Afghanistan Crisis: Regional implications
and impact on Pakistan's polity" in Afghanistan: Factor in Central and
South Asian Politics. Trans Asia Informatics - New Delhi, India. Back
to text.
Tyler, Patrick E. "Saudis Feeling the Pain
of Giving Support to U.S." New York Times, September 24, 2001. Back
to text.
Weiner, Tim. "In Islamic World, Bin Laden's
Esteem Rises." New York Times, February 8, 1999. Back
to text.
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